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Executive Summary

To this end, ten best practices in Safety Learning judged to be a

Within the framework of the EU-funded SAFEMODE project, a series

level leadership and engagement is required. Individually, any one

of confidential, in-depth interviews of seafarers and investigators
was carried out to ascertain the current status of Safety Culture
in the shipping industry, and to recommend possible avenues for

good fit for the shipping industry are proposed, along with outline
explanations of how they work, and indications of where corporateof these approaches can lead to safety improvement, but together
they can lead to a Safety Learning Culture that will yield significant
safety dividends. This White Paper presents its premises, findings

improvement. The interview script covered practices in incident

and recommended ways forward as follows:

and accident investigation and reporting, the Human Element, the

Chapter 1 sets the scene for the study and details the practical

factors that keep the ship safe, the role of the Safety Management

aspects, and considers the potential destinations for shipping,

System, Just Culture and Safety Learning. The seafarers’ and

including Just Culture, Reporting Culture, Culture of Care, Safety

investigators’ interviews were complemented by small focus

Culture and Learning Culture.

groups with unions, education and safety bodies. Participants were
open and genuine in providing their opinions, as anonymity was
preserved. The general consensus among interviewees was that

Chapter 2 presents the detailed insights gathered during the
interviews, supported by direct quotes from participants.

seafarers are the ones who keep ships safe at sea, which is a good

Chapter 3 focuses on best practices in Safety Learning, introducing

omen for Safety Culture in the shipping industry. The originally

the Safety Learning Cycle and the ten proposed Safety Learning

intended ‘destination’ for the shipping industry was to be Just

approaches. This chapter offers practical tools to improve safety

Culture, but the interviews quickly revealed that Safety Learning,

by capitalizing on lessons learned from safety-related incidents,

already evident in some parts of the industry, appeared a more

accidents, near misses and successes.

pragmatic and attainable destination, one that could add safety
improvements and shore up Safety Culture.

Chapter 4 focuses on the voyage from first application of Safety
Learning approaches to achieving a Safety Learning Culture, and
highlights some of the hurdles identified during the interviews, while
providing a roadmap for actors willing to embark on the journey.
The Annex presents six use cases from maritime industry
stakeholders who have already begun the journey towards a
Safety Learning Culture.
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organisation for the safety of European air navigation, was
tasked with exploring the ‘state of play’ in safety reporting and

1

The Shipping Industry
Is the Tide Turning in Favour
of Safety?

learning in the shipping industry. EUROCONTROL was chosen
as it has led a European-wide Safety Culture programme for
the past two decades, and aviation is seen as having a strong
Learning Culture. The idea was simple – to have someone look
at shipping from the outside.
The approach taken was equally straightforward, namely to
interview a number of seafarers and investigators (national
and company), to gather their perspectives on Safety Learning

The shipping industry outdates all other transport domains by
millennia, and in terms of the transport of goods still far outstrips
rail, automotive and aviation by a significant degree, with ships
transporting 90% of global trade. Yet most of this is unseen by
the public, as vessels are often far offshore, and most ports have
progressively migrated outside cities and security requirements
hinder public access. Similarly to rail and aviation domains, major
accidents involving passengers are relatively few, and cargo ships
involved in collisions or groundings do not tend to gain press
unless they lead to major loss of life, environmental damage, or

in the shipping industry. These interviews were carried out by
SAFEMODE partners from the aviation industry so as to ensure
an objective and unbiased assessment, while also ensuring
interviewee confidentiality.
Each of the 19 video interviews1, which took place between
October 2020 and January 2021, lasted around ninety minutes. The
interviews, led by three Human Factors and Safety Culture experts,
were hence carried out during the pandemic. Each interviewee had
the option of seeing the transcript of their interview and amending

substantial blockages of major shipping routes.

answers if they so desired. This happened in several cases, mainly

Arguably, however, shipping accidents are edging more into the

made by any of the participants. All interviews were thus held in

public consciousness, with high profile disasters such as the Costa
Concordia, and the sustained coverage of the Ever Given ultra-large
container ship blocking the Suez Canal. But there is also a growing
push for more safety, and for Safety Culture, coming from within
the industry itself. This may be because certain sectors such as
passenger ships are well aware that even minor accidents can lead
to major reputation damage. Similarly, some cargo sectors hail
from the Chemical and Oil & Gas industries, which themselves have
stringent Safety Management Systems (SMS) and Safety Culture
approaches, so a migration of these processes and practices
towards the relevant shipping sector is to be expected. More
generally, better safety is business common sense, as it focuses on

to add supplementary information. No substantive changes were
good faith, with interviewees giving honest and frank answers to
the questions asked.
The seafarers (both officers and ratings) came from several
segments of the shipping industry, namely cargo/container,
chemical tanker, and passenger/cruise ships. Investigators were
mostly from their respective national authorities but some of them
worked for shipping companies. In total, the respondent set came
from the following thirteen countries: Denmark, France, Italy, India,
Malta, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden,
the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

loss prevention and business continuity: safety is good for business.

The interview questions were generally open in nature, and

If the tide is indeed turning in favour of safety, both from

participant, beginning with investigation and reporting, moving

external scrutiny and internal motivation, it is timely to ask where
improvements can be made system-wide across the industry. One
such potential approach is to enhance overall Safety Culture by

the interview structure followed the same ‘journey’ with each
on to near miss reporting, then to the consideration of the Human
Element and safety at sea. Next followed a discussion of the role
of the SMS at sea, the applicability of Just Culture in the shipping

moving towards what is known as a Safety Learning Culture.

context, and finally how Safety Learning works in practice. At the

With this aim in mind, as part of a three-year European

way forward and the so-called magic wand question, namely: If

Union funded project called SAFEMODE, EUROCONTROL, the

end of each interview, the interviewee was asked about the best
you could change one thing, what would you change?
Applying the saturation principle commonly used in qualitative research, this sample
size was sufficient to gain a robust and valid understanding of the study issues.
1
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The responses from all the interviews were

Possible Destinations for the
Shipping Industry

collated by the team of interviewers, and common
themes and insights extracted separately for

Safety Culture is the over-arching concept

both seafarers and investigators.

that embodies Just Culture, Reporting Culture,
Learning Culture, and the relatively new Culture

In Chapter 2, which presents the insights

of Care arising in the shipping industry. Safety

gained from these interviews, direct quotes are

Culture is essentially the priority given to safety,

used, as these capture what the interviewees

and is hence the motivation for safety at all

were trying to say. In almost all cases, several

carrying out their jobs to the best of their

The Interview approach

ability in sometimes difficult and challenging

I. Investigation

conditions.

II. Reporting
III. Near miss reporting
IV. Understanding the Human Element
V. What keeps ships safe?

people make safety.

VI. Safety Management Systems (SMS)

Following these interviews, four further sessions
were held, one with unions representatives,
one

with

the

European

Maritime

Safety

Agency (EMSA), one with a maritime training
organisation, and one with representatives

timeframe, is that of Learning Culture. Therefore,
following the insights from the interviews,
Chapter 3 focuses on best practices in Safety
Learning, some of which are already evident in
parts of the shipping industry.

one is looking.

should be noted that many of the investigators

industry, and echoes what is said in aviation, that

improvement in safety in a relatively short

we do things safely around here,’ even when no

using slightly different words and contexts. It

This bodes well for Safety Culture in the shipping

and which could possibly deliver a step-change

levels in an organisation, encapsulating ‘the way

interviewees effectively said the same thing,

went out of their way to praise seafarers for

destination that can be reached relatively quickly,

Just Culture, in which people are not punished
for honest mistakes, is seen in many industries
as a driver and enabler for honest reporting in
accidents, incidents and near misses, and hence
underpinning a healthy Reporting Culture.
Learning Culture arises from Reporting Culture,
and focuses on how people, organisations and
entire industries learn from past incidents,
accidents and near misses, as well as successes,

VII. Just Culture

to become safer. The simple argument is that if

VIII. Safety Learning

you have Just Culture you get good reporting, and
if you have good reporting you can learn to be
safer, thus leading to a better Safety Culture.

Safety Culture
Just Culture
Reporting Culture
Learning Culture
Culture of Care

from the International Maritime Organization

Culture of Care concerns looking after the

(IMO). These were not interviews as such,

wellbeing of seafarers and all who work in the

rather they were to present the initial findings

industry, founded on respect and empathy

and gain informal reactions and feedback from

for one’s colleagues, and again can be a major

these bodies’ representatives, and also to help

enabler for safety and Safety Culture, and reflects

Chapter 4 recounts some of the more enduring

identify the best way forward for the industry.

the growing global trend in focus on wellbeing of

structural

Subsequently, the interim results from the

people at work in all industries.

interviews that can impede safety progress.

interviews were presented at several forums,
notably MCA’s Human Element Advisory Group
(HEAG), OCIMF’s Human Factors Committee
(HFC) and IMarEST's Human Element Working
Group (HEWG) in the UK, as well as the Stability
and Safety at Sea (STAB&S) conference in
Scotland, during which valuable feedback was
received from experts in the shipping industry.

At the outset of this study, the intention was to see
whether Just Culture, considered a pre-requisite
for Safety Learning in aviation and now enshrined
in European aviation law, would be a good fit for
the shipping industry. However, fairly early on
in the interviews it became apparent that this
might not be such a straightforward journey for
shipping, and that other destinations might better
suit the shipping industry at this time, and deliver
more added value in terms of safety at sea.

elements

identified

during

the

The resolution of such issues is likely to require
more sustained effort in areas such as Safety
Culture and possibly Culture of Care. The
remainder of the chapter is forward-looking,
including a roadmap for moving towards
a Safety Learning Culture. Shipping clearly
has the potential to plough ahead in Safety
Learning practices, which, once realised, will
enhance safety industry-wide.
The Annex comprises six use cases showing

Hence for this White Paper, and almost since

Safety Learning in practice in today's shipping

the first interviews, it became clear that the

industry.
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2

Insights from Investigator
and Seafarer Interviews

The seafarer’s perspective on investigation is therefore somewhat
different to that of the investigator, and generally seafarers are
wary of investigation.
In particular the phrase ‘blame the ship’ came up independently
numerous times. In this respect it was notable that investigations
rarely consider more distant and onshore contributory factors
to accidents, reinforcing the notion that the ultimate culpability
lies with the ship and its master.

The following eight sections each show representative examples of
verbatim comments received during the interviews.

There was acknowledgement by seafarers that it can be difficult
for an investigator to get to the bottom of what really happened.
Some seafarers said they had seen people fired or ‘let go’ following
an incident or accident, or transferred back to their home country

I. Investigation
II. Reporting
III. Near miss reporting
IV. Understanding the Human Element
V. What keeps ships safe?
VI. Safety Management Systems (SMS)
VII. Just Culture
VIII. Safety Learning
This chapter gives a snapshot of Safety Learning and Safety Culture
in the shipping industry, and is the basis for Chapters 3 & 4 to
propose the best ways forward.

I. Investigation
Investigators made it clear they are not there to apportion blame,
though they do need to verify compliance with procedures. Their
principal aim is to determine the incident or accident’s causes and
contributory factors. They contrasted their focus on the creation of a
narrative of what happened and the rationale behind the sequence
of events, with the judiciary perspective, which focuses on direct
causality, and also has a sense that justice must be served. This
conflict between investigatory bodies and judiciaries is well known
in other industries, and unfortunately can be counter-productive to
Safety Learning. Some investigators pointed out that their reports
were sometimes used by judiciaries to apportion blame, even when
they tried to persuade such judiciaries not to do so. This can lead to
some seafarers requesting their lawyer be present when they are
being questioned, and saying as little as possible.

before the investigators arrived.
An additional noteworthy area concerns support from onshore. It
was generally felt that company Human Resources departments
have little understanding of life at sea and the factors that can lead
to accidents. This was not universal, with some companies clearly
having good onshore and at sea relations and trust, but the issue
arose a number of times.
Others noted that there were cultural variations concerning openness
during investigations, but added that these could be overcome if
the investigators were seen as taking a non-blaming approach, and
if there was a good Safety Culture on the ship. There were positive
examples where investigation and reporting were felt to be fair and
reasonable, and certain approaches such as the Five Whys technique 2
were seen as useful in getting beneath the surface factors.
2

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_whys
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The Investigator’s Perspective
‘The aim is to define the causes, not the responsibility. The idea is to determine the
technical causes, including the Human Element.’
‘Investigation reports are not there to apportion blame, but compliance needs
to be verified.’
‘Recommendations are generated through a collaborative process.’

II. Reporting
Reporting mainly concerns seafarers, those who report. The
responses were generally unfavourable concerning reporting,
although there were some instances of positive reporting attitudes
and practices. The prevailing picture is one of not reporting unless
you have to, because reporting is complicated and seen mainly
as a way of attributing blame to those at the ‘sharp end’. As one
seafarer put it, ‘Convince me I won’t be punished, and I’ll report.’

‘Early on you get a feeling of culpability: whether it will be a straightforward
investigation dealing more with technical issues than human ones. Usually
navigational incidents are related to Human Factors whereas engine fires are heavy
on technical factors.’

On the positive side, several seafarers talked of the importance of

‘Sometimes by the time I [the investigator] arrive, the person involved has been sent
home or is no longer with the company.’

ones, remarked that this was a general trend they saw as newer

‘For the judiciary, there is direct causality, which is different from what is in the
incident report.’
‘The investigator creates a narrative, then the judiciary creates a different one,
sometimes conflictual with the investigatory one. There is a judiciary sense that
Justice must be served.’

having an open culture on board the ship, in particular led by the
captain and the senior officers. Several captains, including older
and younger captains gained their commands.
There were also several positive examples where ships received weekly
information sheets concerning incidents and safety issues from other
parts of the fleet, an excellent example of Safety Learning best practice.

‘We are trying to raise our game. We now want to investigate and interview the crew
as a team. We want to become a learning organisation.’
‘Reporting is what seafarers try to avoid at all costs.’
‘The captain is key for reporting – (s)he sets the tone of the

The Seafarer's Perspective
‘There can be finger-pointing in investigation. Nobody likes it. It can make it difficult to
get to the bottom of an investigation.’
‘Investigators are not looking for the guilty person, but to see which procedures
were not followed.’
‘During an investigation the company lawyers come aboard and will protect you, but
the main reason is to ensure the company is not seen as being at fault.’
‘Sometimes the way questions are asked by the company calls the crew’s
professionalism into doubt.’’
‘It is always “Blame the ship.” That is the first reflex of some companies.’
‘An investigator comes on board and starts asking questions to the people involved,
trying to understand what the technical issues might be.’
‘Sometimes the real truth about what happened does not come out until months later.’
‘Degree of openness can vary strongly according to culture.’
‘A captain is often blamed by the company if not on the bridge when an incident occurs.’
‘There is a lack of empathy and trust from onshore personnel, even when they have
offshore experience.’
‘The “Five Why’s” approach is a good one, as it gets beneath the surface issues.’

on-board reporting culture, especially with multi-cultural
crews. The captain needs to be seen around the ship and
talk to people, be open with them.’
‘The formal system for reporting is very complicated, with multiple
forms. It is a hindrance to reporting.’
‘The captain needs to send the message: We are human and things
can go wrong; there is no blame, only questions.’
‘You are encouraged to report for safety.
But nobody from the office comes offshore.’
‘The best way to find out what really happened is to keep talking
to the crew and have an open door policy – some cultures are very
closely-knit and will defend each other.’
‘The distant factors, those under the influence of the company,
don’t get reported. In one instance after most of the crew had
just been changed, the captain was blamed for not preventing
the incident.’
‘We receive [learning] reports from other ships in the fleet.
It is easy to make a report.’

15
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Issues
‘We do not get the reports we want. We get trips and falls, but

III. Near Miss Reporting
Near miss reporting, in which people report events that
could have resulted in a reportable event (but did not in this
particular instance), are important in a learning system.
They help to see what could have happened, and anticipate

never a mariner falling asleep on watch, or an engineer having
problems assembling machinery.’
‘If you are lucky, 10% of near misses are reported.’
‘Some companies have near miss reporting targets in their SMS.
So the captain ends up altering reports to reach the target.’

accidents rather than waiting until they occur. However, the

‘There is a lot of data but we don’t know how to analyse it. We’re

feedback on near miss reporting was negative.

lacking strong methodologies.’

Despite this negative impression, there were constructive

‘Procedures that are not working are hidden.'

comments on how to improve it, and the barriers that need to

'Such reporting schemes promote organisational secrecy rather

be removed, including a mistaken mindset that an increasing

than organisational learning.’

number of reports indicates a lack of safety. Rather, more

‘For near misses, the narratives are more useful than the checked

reports should be taken as more feedback, more data upon

boxes, but companies count the latter.’

which to understand and improve safety.

‘There is an anonymous reporting scheme. It has been used once

National investigators were quick to point out that

in 17 years.’

generally speaking they have just enough resources to

‘We have a near miss reporting system. It is electronic and time-

analyse formal reports, and so do not have time to delve

consuming, and not very helpful.’

into the near misses. The near miss reporting domain

‘Near miss reporting App can be used to report violations by

therefore more properly resides with the organisations
and their safety departments.

another person, to discredit them.’

Work in progress
‘To make them useful, companies need to focus on quality of the
reports, not quantity, and disseminate anonymised descriptions
of what happened for learning purposes.’
‘We have an electronic voluntary reporting system which leads
to monthly lessons learned. But on board there is no easy access
to computers and very little or no wifi.’
‘National administration tried to implement one but there was
no participation.’
‘We have a near miss system, but if a ship reports too many near
misses, the company will say “your ship is not safe.”’
‘People have to believe they will not be punished, or else they will
not report.’
‘Our near-miss system informs the SMS. If they [onshore] detect a
trend, they update the SMS.’
‘A new App is being introduced by the company.’
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Seafarers

IV. Understanding the Human Element

Both

In order to learn across events, there is a need to

Investigators

categorise them in some way, otherwise there is a
‘Tower of Babel’ effect, resulting in an abundance
of rich stories but little learning from one event to
another. Investigators are often skilled in various
scientific and engineering disciplines that can help
explain fires, corrosion, mechanical failures, etc.
When it comes to the Human Element, however,
it appears that there is far less expertise, or access
to such expertise, to help explain why and how
crews behaved the way they did.
Seafarers had relatively little formal training on
the Human Element, but surprisingly, a number
of investigators similarly felt under-informed
about the Human Element. While one or two felt
they had sufficient knowledge, most investigators

factors. This indicates the need for a common

called for more formal training on Human Factors

language between investigators and seafarers

in incidents. Certain sources of Human Element

on the real factors that contribute to incidents

training were mentioned by several investigators,

and accidents at sea.

such as Cranfield University, and also the so-called
Deadly Dozen developed by MCA3. It is a useful
list, borne from the analysis and experience of
countless incidents and accidents, and allows
training on how to avoid these problems in dayto-day operations (e.g. as used by Shell ).
4

Whilst these categories represent a good and
manageable

hit-list

of

predominant

factors,

responses from the interviewees raised a wider
spread of factors they thought led to accidents and
incidents, as shown on page 19, including some
related to the more ‘distant’ factors mentioned
under the section on reporting, above, such as
lack of manning, bridge design and equipment,
frequent change in crew, and commercial and time
pressures. What is interesting in the word cloud
below and the one in section V, is that,despite some
overlap, there are substantial differences between
investigators and active seafarers’ views about the
contributory factors and the positive safety factors.
It seems seafarers focus more on the enhancement
of their immediate surrounding (their crew and
ship) while investigators include higher-level factors
such as design and ergonomics or organizational
3
4

MCA - Marine Guidance Note MGN520 (M)
Shell LFI - People Make Mistakes (rapidview.co.uk)

The “Deadly Dozen”
Situation awareness
Alerting
Fitness for duty
Fatigue
Communication
Complacency
Culture
Distraction
Work pressure
Capability
Teamwork
Local practices

‘There is not much training for investigators on the Human Element
or Organizational factors.’
‘Human Factors training may not be quite useful for generalist
inspectors. They just need to be aware that models exist and they
can be used if needed (behavioural, individualistic, systems-type
approach). Much of the shipping industry is really focused on
procedural compliance.’
‘Human Element is taken into account in the investigation, because
some elements such as fatigue, time on ship and operational
environment) are in the investigation procedure manual. But I do not
use a specific classification of Human Element.’
'More time should be dedicated to the Human Element. Current
requirements imply 4-5 days of Human Element training out of a 2-3
year training programme, this is simply not enough.’
‘The industry remains very varied and there is very little Human
Factors knowledge and training.’
‘It is still very common in maritime to believe that if things go right,
it is because you are a good sailor and if they go wrong, it is because
you are stupid.’

19

CHAPTER 2

20

V. What Keeps Ships Safe?
One question asked of all interviewees was what keeps ships safe
most of the time? This question is rooted in the knowledge that

Seafarers
Both
Investigators

safety is generally high in the shipping industry, despite a number of
adverse and unpredictable factors. Top of the list were procedures
and experience.
Procedures was a little surprising given the interviewees’ earlier
comments about too strong a focus on procedural compliance
during investigation, but it appears this focus is not unjustified,
as several interviewees highlighted that procedures are in place
foremost to protect them (use of protective equipment, lifelines,
etc.). It should be noted that the terms procedures and SMS were
clearly covering different aspects for the people interviewed, who
considered procedures as a safety protection in their day to day
operations, while the Safety Management System is viewed more as
a burdensome tool barely known to seafarers (see section VI below).
Experience was seen as key, especially at senior level, as so
many things can happen which are not covered adequately by
procedures, and because conditions can change rapidly on a ship.
Professionalism, training and flexibility were also seen as key
attributes for safety. Interestingly, many of the investigators went
out of their way to praise the ship personnel for maintaining such a
high level of safety under frequently very challenging circumstances
including, but not limited to, the COVID-19 pandemic.
One interpretation of the results here is that safety in shipping
comes from a combination of procedures (from company) and
experience (from crew). Optimum safety is achieved whenever
procedures take into account the realities of the operational
context, and experience is complemented with factors such as
professionalism, training and flexibility.
It may be useful at some point to develop a ‘mirror-image’
counterpart of the Deadly Dozen, naming those factors and
properties of the shipping industry that need to be kept healthy in
order to have a safe and resilient ship and fleet.

‘Ship crews excel in being adaptive to changing circumstances.'
'Crews come from various crewing agencies so they are all from
various backgrounds, with different training and experience; they
are constantly partially replaced and yet, nothing goes wrong.’
‘Seafarers look after each other, they take actions they were
not required to take to save the day.’
‘Some national stereotypes are sometimes noticed
by investigators but, all in all, they are all trying
to do the best they can.’
‘The common goal of all seafarers is to keep the operations safe.
Day after day they practice safety.’

21
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VI. Safety Management
Systems (SMS)

VII. Just Culture

Safety Learning is usually part of the safety

fact that seafarers are reluctant to report in case

approach of a company or organisation, and so

they are punished for their actions, whether this

fits under what is called the Safety Management

amounts to a reprimand, loss of job, or even in

System or SMS. However, feedback on SMS from

extreme cases being sent to prison. Just Culture,

seafarers was not positive, as is highlighted in the

which means that no one is punished for honest

insert. This to an extent corroborates the earlier

mistakes, is now implemented in a number of

assertion that there is sometimes quite a gap in

industries to facilitate learning valuable safety

‘Ships are manned by ship owners via a

understanding between onshore departments

lessons. For example, for some time now in

cascade of sub-contracting parties and

and operations on a ship.

aviation the decision has been made that it is

manning agents. Most crew are on 6-month

Moreover, having a learning process does not
mean you have a Learning Culture (in the same
way as owning a cookbook does not mean you
ultimately positive, as it means that new learning
processes can be incorporated, and certain

something, they will never get another
contract. Blacklisting is a reality.’
‘You need to send the message: we’re not

to the next event if unchecked. This decision has

blaming you, but we need to learn.’

certainly contributed to aviation becoming the

‘Most Human Resources have no marine
background. They are defensive as they could

pilots and controllers are not prosecuted after

end up in industrial tribunal trying to defend

incidents or accidents (aside from a very small

the company.’

number of exceptions), and so feel safe to report
honestly and completely, which maximises

specific one for the actual ship. It doesn’t fit the

learning. In Europe, Just Culture in aviation has

However, if the SMS remains generic and only

unique working of the individual ship.’

been enshrined in law, and is defined as follows:

partially relevant to the individual ship, this may

‘For some, safety in the seas just means

simply serve to reinforce what some seafarers

nothing.’

interests. This suggests that the SMS needs to

contracts. They know that if they report

contributed to the event, which will contribute

‘Ships often have a generic SMS, rather than a

perceived as a tool to first preserve management

they are used as scapegoats.’

safest mode of transport. The way it works is that

are a good cook). Nevertheless, having an SMS is

to protect them and the ship, the SMS may be

Stop criminalizing seafarers! Sometimes

questions about the underlying factors that

by the interviews, then learning will be limited.

believe, that while procedures may be there

proceedings, it would really help.

blame someone you stop asking the harder

but if reporting is poor or ‘shallow’, as indicated

are already in place.

‘If we could eliminate criminal & civil case

better to learn than to blame, because if you

Any SMS usually includes a learning process,

foundations for developing a Learning Culture

Is making Just Culture a legal
requirement a good idea?

A number of the comments until now reflect the

‘We have an SMS but it is ‘work as imagined’.
It is pretty awful.’
‘There is one standard SMS for the whole company,

be more reflective of realistic operations and

but each Master has their Standing Orders.’

conditions on board, and since each ship is

‘The SMS is a single tool for the entire fleet,

different, individual (or at least ‘tailored’) SMSs

regardless of the type of vessel. It has identical

would serve safety better than generic ones.

procedures and instructions even when they
make no sense, e.g. for closing ramps when the
ship has no ramps.’
‘The amount of documentation Masters
are supposed to know is staggering e.g. 5000
procedures, all in a three-day handover.’

“A culture in which front-line operators
or other persons [staff] are not
punished for actions or decisions taken
by them that are commensurate with
their experience and training, but in
which gross negligence, wilful violations
and destructive acts are not tolerated.”
(Regulation No. EU 376/2017)
It is not a perfect definition. Determining what
constitutes ‘gross negligence’, for example, can
be very subjective and culturally-dependent.
Similarly, ‘wilful violations’ can be interpreted in

‘We have a general SMS but there are special

different ways. One way out of these difficulties

procedures for each class of ship. It is

is known as the substitution test, in which the

complicated, you have to dig and dig to find the

question is asked whether someone else in

element you are looking for. The captain has to
forward any updates to the engineer.’

the same situation might have made the same
decision or error. It is important that those
applying this test are familiar with the realities of

‘The term Just Culture is not what is important.
Better to talk about Learning Culture.’

work in practice, with all the constraints and tradeoffs that people have to make on a daily basis.
Many aviation organisations do not adopt Just
Culture merely because the law says they must.
For example, one European low-cost airline has a
simple rationale as to why Just Culture is important:
• Finding out what’s really happening
• Having honest discussions
		

- Between managers and staff

		

- Between companies

• Learning from events
• Being able to anticipate future events
All interviewees were asked if they believed
putting Just Culture into legislation in shipping
was a good idea (the Just Culture concept had
to be outlined to about half the participants,
who had not heard of it). Only half thought
the industry was ready for such legislation. All,
however, felt that criminalising seafarers was a
significant impediment to reporting and learning.
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Can you have a Learning Culture
without Just Culture?

VIII – Safety Learning

This is a key question, and the short answer

their

is that you can use Just Culture principles to

improvements. Somewhat surprisingly, this did

enhance learning, even if they are not enshrined

not appear to happen that frequently (though

in the law. An example of key principles is shown

there were concrete examples in the leisure

here via a charter for Just Culture developed in

and small boating sectors).

National Investigators were asked how often

the European aviation industry.

interviewees, however, that Just Culture in the
shipping industry is a step too far at this time.
Reasons cited included the complexity inherent
in the shipping industry with multiple interconnected stakeholders (ship builder, owner,
charterer, and manning via a cascade of sub-

Ensure freedom to work, speak up and report
without fear: people at work should feel free to

contracting parties, etc.) which may hinder
global acceptance of Just Culture throughout
the industry. The absence of secure long term
contracts and economical pressure were also

work, speak up and report harmful situations,

mentioned as potential hurdles to Just Culture

conditions, events, incidents or accidents

implementation.
As there are some excellent approaches to
learning in the industry, this may be a more

Support people involved in incidents or
accidents: the organisation must support
people who are involved in or affected by
accidents. This is the first priority after an
unwanted event.
Don’t accept unacceptable behaviour: gross
negligence and wilful misconduct are very
rare, but cannot be tolerated.
Take a systems perspective: safety must
be considered in the context of the overall
system, not isolated individuals, parts, events

achievable

and

led

to

actual

happening inside the organisations who received
the reports, or via subtle shifts in their Safety
Culture. This contrasts with other industries,
where the primary purpose of investigation is to
prevent recurrence of adverse events wherever
possible, and recommendations often lead
to system changes. Nevertheless, in several
cases good learning systems were reported by
seafarers, whereby they as captains received
weekly or monthly briefings on safety issues and
events relevant to their ship and its operations,

pragmatic

destination

for

shipping. Safety Learning approaches are
therefore discussed in Chapter 3.

that the investigator’s role is to lay out the facts

a societal one (e.g. for families of those
affected) and an industry one (impartial

and analysis as best they can, and then it is up to

feedback to organisations).’

the company and organisation to decide how to

‘Investigations don’t lead to short term

use this information for Safety Learning.

improvements – they are there to improve

Overall however, and despite ‘pockets’ of good
Safety Learning practices, the shipping industry
does not seem to focus on Safety Learning. The
lack of reporting, the criminalisation of seafarers
(not necessarily widespread but enough to set

the overall Safety Culture. This is starting to
happen in ferry and merchant sectors.'
‘Even though investigators don’t provide
solutions, there is organisational learning
in some companies.’

the tone), the ‘blame the ship’ mentality, the lack

‘Companies who combine managers and

of common terminology, and also the diversity of

ship owners are more willing to learn.’

ships and ship systems (bridges etc.), are all seen

‘Pure management companies want strict

as strong impediments to learning. In a sense

recommendations so they can ask for more

these factors are akin to a current causing a

money from ship owners.’

means that more affirmative actions need to be
undertaken to get back on course. Such actions

and hard to do the wrong thing.

improvement’

don’t fix them. They serve a dual purpose,

on performance.

of working that make it easy to do the right thing

a recommendation led to a safety

crews. This represents excellent Safety Learning

‘drift’ away from effective Safety Learning, which

things: improving safety means designing ways

‘‘Can’t think of an example where

‘Investigators define problems, but they

or outcomes. The system is the main influence

Design systems that make it easy to do the right

The Investigator's Perspective

and they cascaded the information to their
practice. This suggests, as one investigator put it,

without fear of unfair, unjust or unreasonable
blame or punishment.

reports

Much of the learning cited seemed to be indirect,

There was a feeling amongst a number of

Just Culture Charter

investigation

are the focus of the next chapter.

‘Maritime has plenty of accidents to
learn from, but due to resources, we are
analysing just the tip of the accidents.'
‘Recommendations can improve safety,
though sometimes the process takes years.’
‘There is a strong resistance in the industry
to link anything organisational to safety.’
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3

Safety Learning
Approaches for the
Shipping Industry

THE SAFETY LEARNING CYCLE

This chapter reviews ten Safety Learning approaches that should
be a good fit for the shipping industry (some are already in use by
various companies). Taken individually, they can improve safety via
learning from mistakes (as well as successes). Taken as a whole,
and if ‘enacted’ (made real, and not simply talked about), and
backed up by safety leadership onshore and at sea, they can lead
to a true Safety Learning Culture.
Because Safety Learning can take place at many levels in shipping
organisations, it is useful to first consider how Safety Learning
works via a Safety Learning Cycle, and what Safety Learning means
to different layers in a company, from deckhand to CEO.

The Safety Learning Cycle 5
In this cyclical model developed for the SAFEMODE
project, if any adverse or potentially adverse
events, or significant successes or recoveries

However, more effective Safety Learning goes

changes to the ship system. This then constitutes

from failure are detected during operations or

deeper, identifying how to protect other ships and

risk-informed design.

maintenance, they are reported and documented.

crews on other days under similar but not identical

This is Data Capture. These data are then analysed

circumstances. Learning is focusing on the shipping

Risk-informed design is rarer to see because

to see how and why the events occurred – the

system, through the lens of the event or accident

ships, like aircraft or trains, last decades, and once

context, causes and contributory factors – as

in question. Often at this level, multiple events or

designed and built, are very expensive to retrofit.

well as what stopped them from having worse

accidents are being considered, in order to achieve

Nevertheless, since many new interfaces are digital,

consequences, sometimes called the barriers.

system-wide learning rather than ‘episodic’ learning.

this means more change is possible, and it also
makes sense to feed what is known about human

key

The final step in the learning cycle, which is more

factors and barriers to act upon to reduce

rare to see, is when lessons learned do not simply

recurrence, and hence to the specification of

affect training, crewing and procedures – the so-

At this level there can also be Deep Learning, related

safety improvement measures. So far, this is

called ‘softer’ (and also cheaper) elements to fix

to system-wide issues such as crew manning or

localised learning: these specific factors on this

– but also the design of vessels and the on-board

fatigue management, or to factors deeper in the

particular day on this specific ship with this

equipment, including human-machine interfaces

organisation concerning how ships and fleets are

particular crew led to these outcomes, and

as for example found in the engine room and on

run, and how safety and human resources are

here is how to prevent it happening again. This

the bridge. Ideally, at this level, design changes are

managed. Deep Learning aims to tackle the endemic

learning can then be expanded to consider

informed by risk models that consider all possible

and sometimes structural organisational, design or

other events that could have happened with

known causes and contributors, and their relative

Human Element issues that contribute to a wider

this crew and ship, knowing its operations

importance as evidenced by operations as well as

range of incidents and accidents, whether these are

and constraints, leading to more generalised

incident and accident experience. Such risk models

at the level of the organisation, a segment of the

ship-wide learning.

can help pinpoint where to best focus safety-related

industry, or the industry as a whole.

This

leads

to

the

identification

https://safemodeproject.eu/about-safemode

5

of

error as a function of design, into the design process.
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The fourth level is fleet-wide Safety Learning, e.g. a company’s fleet
of ferries or chemical tankers or containerships, etc. This is a powerful
learning platform, as the organisational culture will be relatively
stable across the ships in the fleet, the operations and crewing
conditions will be similar, and the recipients will generally see the
lessons as relevant, since the lessons come from the company they
work for. In short, people reading or hearing about lessons from
other ships in the fleet will be thinking, ‘that could have been me!’
The language, format and media of such lessons can be standardised
across the company, and messages from the company leadership
can accompany them periodically, to show that those at the top are
serious about safety. This level of learning is critical to the fleet’s
operational safety, so it is important to ensure that lessons learned
are not ‘lost in translation.’ There is little point in transmitting
Safety Learning aggregated by the organisation to the ship level, if
the information cannot be adequately interpreted by the particular
ship and its crew.
The fifth Safety Learning level is sector-wide, e.g. all chemical
tankers, all cruise ships, etc. Safety Learning at this level can be
harder to achieve due to competition and industry complexity. But at
this level, statistics can be both powerful and compelling concerning

Six Safety Learning Levels
Safety learning can occur at various levels in the industry:
The most obvious level is individual – we all try to learn from our own mistakes, or
from watching others make or avoid mistakes. However, this is not so helpful when the
first time you find yourself in a situation, you make a mistake and there is an accident.
The second level is Team or Group learning, where we learn as a work-related group.
This can be a very effective form of learning, because we are hearing from our peers,
who perform the same jobs as us. This learning can be formal or informal, for example
via team debriefs, or simply sharing stories within the group. The group may also be
culturally defined, e.g. along national lines, so that learning occurs within a segment
on the ship, that can then ideally be spread across different teams and hierarchical
boundaries. Again, this can lead to effective Safety Learning because the group shares
the same language, cultural references and values. And if staff turnover is relatively
high, this can be an effective form of induction into the ship-wide Learning Culture, so
new arrivals know very quickly ‘how safety is done around here.’
The third level is ship-based learning, whereby lessons learned are cascaded up
and down between the crew and senior officers, the intention being to instil safety
awareness throughout the entire crew. This is where Safety Learning starts to become
systemic, because the various crew components are adapting the information to their
ways of working.

the high priority threats in terms of safety, along with their causes
and contributors. This is also the level at which systemic learning
can have significant impact; if certain safety recommendations are
adopted as best practice in one part of the sector, they can rapidly
spread across the entire sector. This is the level at which regulatory
institutions often get involved, because they collect and analyse
casualty statistics that demand intervention. In other industries this
is usually the level at which organisations collectively tackle key safety
issues, because they are seen as business imperatives. Thus, multistakeholder safety alliances can form in different shipping sectors
to address a hit-list of safety concerns, with or without regulatory
encouragement.
The final level is industry-wide, dealing with issues that affect
multiple sectors, such as regulations related to work and rest hours,
or minimum safe crewing, or rules concerning increasing automation
(including future autonomous shipping). At this level it is usually the
institutional body at the top of the food chain – e.g. IMO in maritime,
ICAO in aviation and IAEA in nuclear power – who coordinates
learning, via stakeholder meetings and state-level committees.
Safety learning at this level can be relatively slow, but can have the
most widespread and sustained impact.
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TEN SAFETY LEARNING APPROACHES
THE SHIELD TAXONOMY

Ten Safety Learning Approaches
The ten Safety Learning approaches broadly fit into the earlier
Safety Learning cycle. One difference in the two cycles is the focus
on Deep Learning rather than Risk-Informed Design. This is because
risk models are not so commonly used in the shipping domain.
mooring, navigating in a narrow channel, watch1. A Common Language [Taxonomy]

keeping, etc.) and the Human Element, especially

In order to learn, there must be commonly

the human performance influencing factors (e.g.

understood ways of describing events, accidents

fatigue, situation awareness, workload, etc.). If an

and the Human Element. The technical term for

organisation can agree on these, learning can really

this is a Taxonomy, which is basically an agreed set

take off. For the Human Element part, the taxonomy

of definitions and descriptions. If every incident is

should deal with not only what happened, but also

described in everyday parlance, there is a Tower

how and why it happened, including more distant

of Babel effect, because we all see and describe

organisational factors. This ‘extra thinking’ already

things slightly differently, so learning will be hard

goes a long way towards Safety Learning.

because every single event will seem unique. In
practice, taxonomies can become complicated and

There are many taxonomies (see above one

unwieldy, to the point that seafarers don’t relate to

example developed by SAFEMODE), and they can

them, so care must be taken in their development.

all facilitate learning, so an organisation needs to

A taxonomy needs two components – a way of

decide and settle on one – chopping and changing

describing the context – the ship operation (e.g.

is counter-productive.
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2. Investigating Differently
The investigation process is clearly key to learning.
The actual information entered into a database
is the first step leading to what will ultimately
be discussed by the company in terms of how to
prevent accident recurrence. Incident and accident
records can even inform a court of law judging
culpability after an accident. Such information
critically depends upon what was recorded and
stated during the initial investigation. Investigations
are generally good at determining what happened,
and the immediate factors that led to the event.
They are sometimes less good at determining why
the event happened, as well as the more distant
organisational factors that, if left unaddressed, will
lead to recurrence or occurrence of a similar event.
It is useful to consider the accident ‘iceberg’, as
shown on the following page, when considering
causality and Safety Learning. The events and facts
– who did what, when and where, are the surface
layer, relatively easy to document. But they in no
way tell the whole story.
Below the waterline are the Human Factors, or in

Investigating differently goes hand-in-hand with a

that nobody meant to happen. Investigation intends

Human Element terms the ‘Deadly Dozen’ factors,

taxonomy that enables the investigator to plumb

to make sense of the event to a number of parties:

that can lead people into error. Deeper still are

these depths when required, and contributes

those caught up in it, their parent organisation, the

the factors affecting how we get the job done on

to identifying deeper levels of factors beyond

loved ones of those injured or killed, judiciaries,

a day-to-day basis, when workarounds might

the surface causes. It also goes without saying

society as a whole, and of course the industry that

be necessary, or when someone – whether the

that investigating differently means focusing

wants to do better next time. It is important for

individual seafarer or their senior officer or captain

on learning, and throwing blaming overboard.

Safety Learning to retain the original sense-making

– has to make a judgment call concerning trade-offs

This means that the language and nature of

of those at the heart of the event. Simple narratives

between risk and productivity. This is where we have

investigative interviews must be non-pejorative.

are the best way to achieve this.

to admit that we don’t live in a perfect world, that

The good news is that this approach and attitude

procedures will not cover every possible situation.

doesn’t conflict from what was heard in the

Procedures must therefore always remain open

interviews with national investigators.

to improvements that better reflect the reality of
working conditions / work as done.

Since taxonomies change and evolve over time, and
any classification system inevitably refines what

At the deepest level are the organisational and

seafarers originally said, and so loses something,

cultural factors that can affect safety. These

it is crucial for Safety Learning purposes to include

are usually only detected when looking across

a narrative as part of the investigation, i.e. what

a number of incidents, or else are raised to the

the seafarer(s) said, in their own words. Ultimately,

surface and brought into the daylight following

investigation is a form of sense-making, trying to

a major accident.

make sense of an unplanned, unfortunate event
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3. From a Database, to an Evidence Base,

there is more potential to analyse the data to

to a Learning Platform

determine more subtle systemic safety problems

Usually the problem with databases is not so

that need to be addressed. For example, if factors

much putting the data in, but getting it out as

such as ‘communications’ or ‘situational awareness’

useful information, and this is equally true of

are cited in a sizable number of incidents and

incident and accident databases. If the taxonomy

accidents, studies can be carried out to determine

is complex, as is often the case, searching for

why they arise and how to mitigate these factors

accident types or types of Human Element

and their attendant risks. The ideal, therefore, is

causes/contributory factors can be tricky. Yet

to have this kind of active database and evidence

a database can clearly be useful for Safety

base from which to learn. It is then not simply

Learning, as it comprises an evidence base from

a repository where incident data are stored for

which the most common and severe accidents,

some later day, but an active learning platform

as well as their causes and contributory factors,

whose analysis can guide safety improvement.

can emerge. Rather than learning from each

The SAFEMODE project is developing a new

individual accident, more general and even

database called SHIELD6 , precisely for such a

system-wide lessons can be drawn by looking

purpose. Although other Maritime databases

across different events, and the resultant lessons

already exist, SHIELD has a specific focus on the

can have a more powerful impact on safety.

human factors in maritime accidents.

Additionally, the need for change may not be
warranted by a single event until it is realised that
there are many more similar events. Databases
can therefore be a call to action and a means of
prioritising safety recommendations. An example
of this in shipping is the current concern over
accidents in enclosed spaces on ships. Each
accident may look different, and each ship and
crew may be unique, but the problem clearly
applies to many vessels.
Databases are often based on mandatory event
reports

and

accident

reports,

unless

they

specifically include near miss or other types of
reports. They can include links to official public
reports, or may contain ‘sanitised’ material
wherein the details of people and companies are
excluded, to make them more anonymous. Such
collections of incidents can be company-wide,
national, regional (e.g. European) or global.
Even if the reports feeding into the database only
deal with the surface layer of the event or accident,
they nevertheless generate useful statistics to
determine general safety priorities in a company
or a sector of the shipping industry. If the database
records go deeper into why the event happened,
6

https://safemodeproject.eu/shield.htm#safemode-hf-taxonomy
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4. Shipping’s Ten Most Wanted
In a number of industries there is a sense that
you cannot address everything at the same time.
This has resulted in a number of organisations
identifying their ‘Ten Most Wanted’ list of accidents
or factors to reduce, or of safety improvements
to implement. Often such lists are updated each
year, whereupon items in the list can either be
removed or maintained, depending upon tangible
improvement progress or shifts in priorities. The
US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
has its own top ten, and for example, European
air traffic management has its Top 5 risks. Both
‘hit-lists’ are updated annually based on safety
progress and incident and accident occurrences.
The advantage of a hit-list is a consolidated focus
on key safety areas, often across companies and
internationally, or segment-wide (e.g. container
ships or cruise ships). Rather than a ‘drip-feed’
approach to safety due to diluted resources
split between many safety issues, there is a
concentrated surge of effort which can often
create a breakthrough in safety terms.
5. Group Learning Review
Most of the time those involved in an incident
are interviewed separately, and then part of the
interviewer’s role is to ‘put the pieces together’

are often surprised, either because they didn’t see

Such a question should only be used for learning,

the event that way, or because they were unaware

not as a form of entrapment.

as to what was actually happening elsewhere.
Essentially, new information may come to light,
which can inform Safety Learning with respect to
teamwork, understanding of each other’s roles,
equipment design and communications.

Third, group learning reviews can enhance
Safety Culture on the ship, via involving the
crew in a non-jeopardy, non-pejorative open
discussion whose sole focus is to learn to
be safer. It also serves to bolster collective

to yield a coherent timeline and account of the

Second, the individuals in the crew, and the crew

(crew-based) Safety Culture, as well as peer

events as they unfolded, the factors impacting

as a whole, may otherwise never receive the full

understanding and support. If such reviews

on the event, what went right, and what could go

picture of what is believed to have happened and

occur onshore, they can significantly enhance

better next time. Yet ships are not composed of

why. They can of course try to find the final report

ship-shore understanding and relationships.

autonomous individuals, but of crews working in

when it is delivered a year later, but this is very late

teams. For example, a collision between two ships

from an individual learning perspective, and during

involves two Watch-keeping teams. A mooring

this period they may try to draw their own lessons

operation involves many parts of the ship’s crew in

from the event, which may not be the right lessons.

different locations, from the bridge to the engine
room, to those handling the mooring operation
down on the deck and quay. Whilst each seafarer
involved should be interviewed separately (there
are sound reasons for doing this), there are three
reasons for also considering bringing the crew
together at a later point, or subsets of the crew, to
review the event and learn from it. This is less about
investigation and more about learning. First, when
people hear others’ stories about an event, they

Group learning reviews do need to be handled
carefully, and the investigator will need to judge
whether senior officers being present might make
other crew members ‘clam up’ and not say anything

Here is where investigating differently must also

other than what they believe they are expected to

play a part. During such group interviews, the

say. It also needs to be ensured that one person

question needs to be asked, ‘what would you do

does not become the focus of attention as the

differently if this happened again?’ This is a critical

scapegoat for the incident. Furthermore, rather

Safety Learning question used in a number of

than recording it formally, it is about listening; not

industries. However, in the interviews it was

only the investigator listening to what the crew

pointed out that if seafarers answer this question

have to say, but the crew listening to each other’s

they may find themselves in trouble, as any answer

versions of the event. The outcome should be

could be taken as an admission of guilt that they

deeper understanding, and a better idea of what

knew of, and did not follow, a safer procedure.

to do next time should similar conditions arise.

37

CHAPTER 3

38

6. Deep Dives

developing trends, they are an organisational

nearly happened, or rescuing someone), or simply

A deep dive is where a group of people try to get

attempt to ‘see around the corner’, and are seen as

doing the job in an exemplary and safe manner –

to the bottom of an accident or a series of related

a hallmark of Safety Intelligence. Deep Dives can also

can also encourage safer behaviour amongst the

accidents, to look at it from all angles, to understand

be used to determine where best practices seen in

rest of the crew, and can send a strong message

it and see what lessons can be drawn from it.

one part of the fleet could be applied elsewhere.

that safety is valued.

It is called a deep dive because the idea is that the

A significant added benefit of Deep Dives when

group immerses itself in the event(s) for a day or

carried out at Board level, is that they can have

Safety stories along the lines of ‘it nearly happened

several days, to discuss and thoroughly understand

a positive impact on Safety Culture, both for the

to me’ wherein someone tells of how a normal

it, and to see how it relates to current and future

Board members participating, and for the general

operation nearly went badly wrong, are useful

operations. As well as considering a specific

workforce who know that safety is being taken

because they engender watchfulness in crews,

accident or accident trend, Deep Dives can also

seriously at the highest level.

which can counteract complacency and encourage

focus on a particular operation, or a specific safety

them to speak up when they see an operation

barrier, or a developing or new threat. Importantly,

7. Safety Intelligence Sharing

Deep Dives are seen as core business, and are

Already from the interviews there were several

carried out to protect business interests. Deep

excellent examples of rapid sharing of safety-

Safety scenario discussions are used to more

Dives can take place at three organisational levels:

related briefing notes or safety stand downs using

actively engage crews in discussion and safety

safety materials produced centrally, across fleets. In

decision-making. The idea is to take an event –

some cases the captains of each ship receive weekly

real or hypothetical – and talk through what is

updates of key safety messages or of incidents that

happening, and then every now and again stop

had happened very recently and lessons to be

and ask the participants what they would do at that

learned. This is very fast by any industry’s standard.

point. Usually, even in a small group not everyone

The advantage of such fleet-wide safety bulletins is

has the same idea, so it is useful to explore

that ships' crews can see what happened on similar

the reasons they each have for their proposed

vessels to their own, and the captain and other

course of action, and then continue evolving the

senior officers can brief their crews. Such briefings

scenario. Such discussions are not intended to be

are critical, as Safety Learning is not so much

judgmental, they are there to enable the crew to

measured by how much an organisation knows, or

reflect on safety. They can also be useful to better

how much accident data it has, as by how much has

understand why the procedures are there, or in

been transmitted effectively to seafarers, so that

some case, raise issues as to whether they are fit-

they can integrate the learning into their working

for-purpose on the vessel in question.

I. Crew Level
(on the ship, or onshore during training)
II. Safety Management Level
III. Board Level (involving CEO and other Board
Members, facilitated by Safety Director / Manager)
A central part of Deep Dives entails considering
which barriers are still working, and which are not.
As a non-shipping example, following the tragic
Überlingen mid-air collision between two aircraft
in 2002, a ‘Swiss cheese’ type barrier model was

Safety Deep Dives

constructed to understand fully what had gone

Explore a specific accident or incident trend.

wrong. This was independent of the exhaustive

Examine the basis for safety.

accident investigation going on in parallel at the

slipping out of its safe boundaries.

Which barriers are still working?

practices, as well as receive the message that the

linked to coordination and communications,

Which barriers are no longer working?

company cares about learning.

thought to be effective prior to the accident,
were regularly failing, or no longer maintained.

What are the key Human Factors involved
(both positive and negative)?

Safety videos are another excellent medium

work together, can meet to enhance a better

This had broad implications for a number of

for transmitting safety information, and again

understanding of each other’s work, working

Have any external factors changed?

some excellent ones have been seen in shipping,

conditions, operating culture and day-to-day

Have internal factors changed
(staffing, competency, etc.)?

dealing with critical operations, or focusing on

constraints. This approach has been used in air

avoiding problems such as complacency with

traffic, for example, bringing together engineers

respect to following safety rules, or speaking

and air traffic controllers, who rely on each other’s

up when necessary. Videos literally ‘bring to life’

work, but have very little day-to-day connection,

safety concerns, and can show the unintended

and represent quite different sub-cultures in

consequences that can arise from seemingly small

the same organisation. In shipping, as has been

mistakes of oversights.

voiced numerous times in the interviews, there

time. What was found was that several barriers

operations, and numerous organisations in
Europe. Deep Dives can be used to consider
how close an organisation believes it is to a
major accident, by evaluating the health of the

Are the procedures still fit for purpose?

safety barriers in place, and how often they are

What are the deep systemic factors?

being challenged or overcome.

Where are the hotspots in the fleet?

Deep Dives are also used to look ahead, e.g. to

Where are there best practices in the fleet?

consider the ramifications of future changes,

What can be shared across the fleet?

such as digitisation, autonomous shipping, future
pandemics, etc. When looking at new threats or

Safety Exchange is where different groups in
the same organisation, who never normally

is often a gap between personnel at sea and
Rewards and recognition of staff for safe behaviours

those onshore. Such meetings can lead to better

– whether saving the day (avoiding an accident that

understanding between all parties, and can
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help the onshore personnel relate more to the

also been established between several NGOs to drive

realities of operational safety at sea, increasing an

the international regulatory agenda, as is the case of

organisation’s Safety Culture.

the Human Element Industry Group (HEIG), whose

directors and CEOs being willing to listen to any
safety issues. In one study, top aviation executives
said that 50% of their ‘intelligence’ on safety risks
came from talking to people. Furthermore, they
know that people won’t always come to them, so
they seek people out. This is obviously more of a
challenge in shipping, but with modern technology,
as the pandemic has shown, online meetings and

members as accredited to IMO are dedicated to an
increased understanding of the human element in
order to improve safety and operations at sea.
9. Reverse Swiss Cheese Theory
When Professor James Reason proposed the
Swiss Cheese accident model, in which safety
barriers are like slices of cheese with holes in
them (because no barriers are perfect), and if

discussions can be relatively effective.

the holes line up you get an accident, the initial

8. Safety Forums, Safety Alliances

outcome. Later, however, he focused more on

Safety Forums are inter-organisational groups,

REVERSE SWISS CHEESE – MARITIME

Upstream

Open Door Safety refers to senior managers,

Economy, Pressures, Laws,
Regulations, Societal Trends

focus was on the barriers closest to the accident
the organisational antecedents of accidents, on
the grounds that decisions made and actions

industry, passenger ships, etc.) who get together

taken at these levels can lead to many accidental

periodically to discuss the key safety issues in their

outcomes. These ‘upstream’ barriers, if deficient,

organisations, and to share best practices and

put pressure on the downstream ones. Today,

lessons learned. Such forums can either be held at

however, whilst it is common to talk of human

an executive level (e.g. annually), or more usually

error on the ship, it is less common to hear

at a more operational or safety level (quarterly

anyone talking about ‘error’ onshore, whether

and annually). One that was mentioned several

management decisions that make safe work

and replace people when things go wrong,

intently on what the crew do on the ship, the lens

times during the interviews was the Marine

harder on board ships, design choices that make

rather than fixing the underlying problem. This

is turned around and becomes a telescope, looking

Accident Investigators International Forum

operations

is the opposite of Safety Learning.

at the more distant factors, some of which may be

(MAIIF), which seems to embody best practice

errors that can lead to system faults, or even the

in this area. Safety Forums are useful ways

effects of weak regulation on safety at sea.

more

error-prone,

programmer

of exchanging ideas and disseminating good
practices across a large range of organisations,
and also across different segments of the
industry. As such they contribute significantly to
general shipping safety, and to Safety Culture in
the industry as a whole.
Safety Alliances between a cluster of companies
or organisations can be a powerful way to promote
and enhance safety in key areas, especially when
those companies put aside competition in certain
areas in order to tackle key safety problems.

Reversing

the

Swiss

Cheese

model

is

a

challenge, and requires the mindset that
human error does not only affect those aboard
ships, but affects us all. In fact human error
is a normal process, the flip-side of human
flexibility that is key to our ever-adaptive, and
generally successful performance. We all make
mistakes. Most mistakes onshore have little
consequence. Yet some of them do, as they
result in constraints for those at sea.

An example of a safety alliance in shipping is the Oil

Downstream

usually in one segment of an industry (e.g. oil

onshore. An increasing number of organisations
This shift in mindset is a journey that any industry

are also trying to do this, to learn deeper and more

has to undertake if it is serious about increasing

significant safety lessons.

safety. This does not mean that managers, those
at the so called ‘blunt end’, will find themselves in

Identifying where there are organisational safety

the dock or even imprisoned following accidents,

vulnerabilities or ‘blind spots’ can be achieved in

as has happened once or twice in aviation

several ways. Safety Culture or climate surveys

and elsewhere. Managers are also subject to

can reveal issues at this level, and analysing

the full range of Human Factors, constraints

events and incidents/accidents using a taxonomy

and pressures and – as with seafarers – there

such as the SHIELD one can also pinpoint where

is almost never an intention to cause harm.

to focus attention. Deep Dives, and focus groups

Rather, this means asking hard questions, such

with management and seafarers, can also help to

as ‘how are our decisions onshore influencing crew

see where safety concerns are not being tackled

performance, safety and Safety Culture at sea?’

by the organisation, or could be better addressed.

Companies’ International Maritime Forum (OCIMF).

It is difficult to have a Safety Culture and an

The figure above is a provisional Swiss Cheese-style

Recently, Together in Safety was set up as a non-

effective Safety Learning Culture when it is

model of shipping safety, with a particular focus on

regulatory maritime industry consortium with the

believed that only seafarers make mistakes of

the upstream safety determinants as well as the

common purpose of working together to improve

any consequence. Inevitably, there will be a

downstream ones. It is as if, rather than looking

safety performance. Other safety alliances have

tendency to blame those who make mistakes,

at human error through a microscope, focusing
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10. A Maritime-Focused Human Factors Toolkit
The discipline of Human Factors is aimed at giving
industries a toolset with which to optimise human
performance at work, thereby improving system
safety, performance and resilience. Human Factors
can help to maximise the safety impact of safety
lessons learned the hard way via incidents and
accidents. The SAFEMODE project is developing a
Human Factors Toolkit for the Maritime industry,
testing the ‘goodness of fit’ of each technique with
maritime case studies and stakeholders. This toolkit
can help to improve design of ships, their bridges
and engine rooms, as well as enhancing training,
procedures, team-working and human-machine
interfaces for complex and safety critical operations.
It has been noted that each ship is unique, and each
ship’s bridge is different. But the common element
is the human crew. A Human Factors approach
can generate general guidance that would be
applicable to numerous ship bridge and equipment
designs. This is the intent of SAFEMODE, to feed
in learning from incidents and accidents (via the
SHIELD database and taxonomy), as well as insights
from application of the HF Toolkit7, and deeper risk
understanding from risk models, to lead to a more
resilient ship system.

7

https://safemodeproject.eu/products.aspx?id=4

Human Element and Human Factors:
what’s in a name?
During the interviews and subsequent discussions,
it was noticed that there is little mention of
Human Factors, the scientific discipline associated
with human performance in work situations.
Indeed there appear to be less Human Factors
people working in the shipping industry than in
comparable domains. The term Human Element
has a slightly different sense compared to Human
Factors. An accident due to the Human Element is,
superficially at least, suggestive that the human
was at fault. An accident due to Human Factors
is more likely seen as due to the factors that
influenced the crew member(s) on that day, and
that another person operating under the same
factors might have made the same mistake. The
inference then is that the system needs to change
in order to avoid recurrence, whether through
changes to training, procedures, design, etc. It may
therefore be worth considering in the shipping
industry whether to continue with the term Human
Element (e.g. for practical or legacy reasons), or
transition to the term and scientifically-grounded
discipline of Human Factors at some point in the
near future. This could also help learning between
shipping and other industries.
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4

A New Destination for the
Shipping Industry?

Criminalisation of
Seafarers

Reluctance to
Report

Less Human Factors
than in other industries

Throughout the interviews and subsequent discussions with

Degree of variety
in ship design

shipping personnel and experts, four potential ‘destinations’
have been under discussion, and a fifth – Culture of Care, focusing
on wellbeing, respect and empathy – was added following
presentations of interim results at two international meetings.

Over-focus on
Procedural
non-compliance

Onshore
non-understanding
of life at sea

The originally intended destination of Just Culture has been found
repeatedly to be problematic at this time, though not perhaps for
certain shipping organisations who are already well on their way
with this journey. Reporting Culture is desirable, but is essentially an

Blame the ship.
Scant consideration of
‘upstream’ factors

Captain is responsible
even if not on duty

outcome of other destinations, and cannot be forced to happen on its
own. This leaves Safety Culture, Culture of Care, and Learning Culture.
Culture of Care is relatively new, and probably needs to be
developed to see how it would apply, and championed by leading
organisations who are convinced of its merits. If shipping chooses
to chart this destination, other industries will no doubt be interested
to follow its progress.
Safety Culture, which in effect sits above and encompasses the
other four ‘cultures’, is already in existence in certain quarters, but
appears to be patchy and uneven in its application, and misses a
guiding model or framework that could foster more widespread
uptake of Safety Culture approaches and practices. Although there
have been numerous reviews of Safety Culture for Maritime, the
shipping industry needs to adapt an approach and ‘own’ it, so that
it truly fits the industry.
It is therefore Learning Culture that has gained most traction in
all the interviews and discussions, because of an appetite to learn
to be safer, and because there are already excellent examples of
learning practices in the industry. A Learning Culture is therefore
concluded by this study to be the most worthwhile destination
at this stage, in terms of increasing operational safety. This does
not preclude other destinations being followed at the same time,
whether Safety Culture, Culture of Care or even Just Culture.

That would represent a ‘fleet’ approach to

everyone knows they are there but they are not

enhancing safety. In reality, none of the five

acknowledged, discussed or addressed – need to

‘cultures’ are truly independent from each other;

be tackled, or else safety progress may be slowed.

they all influence each other to a degree, and

The good news is that some best practices are

so moving ahead in one direction will ultimately

already in evidence in a number of companies, and

make travel to the other destinations easier, too.

it is clear that there is strong motivation for safety

Navigating Tricky Waters

on board most ships, as well as significant safety
expertise and procedural know-how both onshore

However, the interviews highlighted a number of

and at sea. This means there is a good foundation

impediments for the development of a Learning

for a Learning Culture, even if certain normally

Culture. The criminalisation of seafarers involved

prescribed prerequisites, such as Just Culture, are

in accidents, and the ‘blame the ship’ attitude

absent, at least at the institutional level.

cited repeatedly in interviews, are real blockers
to reporting and learning, and hence to safety
overall. Similarly, an over-focus on procedural
compliance without fully questioning the fitnessfor-purpose of those procedures in the actual
event, as well as a lack of focus on ‘upstream’
or distant factors as precipitators of accidents,
means that learning will remain at the surface
level, and incidents and accidents are doomed
to recur. These and other such problems –
often known as elephants in the room because
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From Safety Learning to a Safety
Learning Culture
Whilst Safety Learning approaches may appear
relatively straightforward, achieving results from
them and cultivating a Safety Learning Culture
takes time and commitment.

Safety
Forums /
Alliances
Ten Most Wanted
Reverse Swiss Cheese

Taxonomy,
Evidence Base, Deep Dives,
Human Factors Toolkit

The difference between Safety Learning and
Safety Learning Culture is that in the latter, Safety
Learning is seen as a core part of the business and

Investigating Differently,
Group Learning Review,
Safety Intelligence Sharing

all activities in an organisation, from the Board to
the ‘sharp end’. It is not simply the implementation
of a set of techniques and processes used by the
organisation, but is a mindset throughout the
organisation, in which thinking and speaking up
about safety in order to learn and share safety
lessons becomes a reflex.

Safety Learning Culture
Arrival Checklist

Safety
Intelligence
Sharing +
Safety Forums +
Safety Alliances

Investigating
Differently +
Group
Learning
Reviews

Taxonomy +
Database
/ Learning
Platform +
Ten Most
Wanted

Human
Factors
Toolkit

Deep Dives +
Reverse Swiss
Cheese

Can seafarers point to where
better practices were adopted
due to Safety Learning?

Way-points towards a Safety Learning Culture

that takes time, as well as understanding

Are the top 5 safety risks identified?

There is a certain logical progression in the learning steps, from

and commitment from the organisation’s

Do seafarers agree these are the top 5?

straightforward information-sharing approaches to learning,

Achieving a Safety Learning Culture is a voyage

leadership. The good news is that applying
any of the Safety Learning approaches during
the journey towards a Safety Learning Culture
should result in safety improvements.
In terms of how the different Safety Learning
approaches interact with different levels in

Learning only happens when
people speak up. How does the
company leadership encourage open
communication on safety?
Do seafarers and onshore staff see
Safety Learning as part of their job?

an organisation, the pyramid figure gives an

Do procedures ever evolve,

indication, in that three of the approaches are

or are they cast in stone?

primarily aimed at seafarers (the lower part of
the pyramid), four are of a more technical nature
(often executed by the safety department), the
others leaning towards senior management,

SMS is the embodiment of organizational
Safety Learning. Do seafarers see the
SMS as relevant to them?

to enhancing the investigation approach, to analysing events
formally with explanatory taxonomies leading to prioritised
recommendations for risk reduction, to investing in Human Factors,
leading to risk-informed design and decision-making, all the way
through to actively involving the Boards of shipping companies in
risk management.
There are no hard divisions between these ‘steps’, and organisations
may choose to do things in a different order, or skip some elements.
But many organisations, depending on the size of their operation,
could reach Level 3 relatively quickly and, for example, add ‘Deep
Dives’ from Level 5, and decide to drop anchor. This would already
represent a good learning culture. Other larger organisations, or

Is there a forum where captains and

groups of companies, may decide to venture further to Level 5, in

Deep Dives can involve all three layers). The

Board members meet and talk safety?

order to remain at the leading edge of Safety Learning. Once levels 3

shape of the pyramid is intended to show that

Which best describes

even though operational safety is at the bottom,

your company’s mindset:

assisted by the safety technical layer (note that

in order to achieve significant Safety Learning
and a Safety Learning Culture, there needs to be
engagement from the top.

- People are people, so accidents

and above are reached, there is also the potential to collaborate with
other industries. Rather than simply comparing between shipping,
rail, aviation, etc. there is the potential to collaborate on Safety
Learning. This represents the highest form of Safety Learning.

will inevitably happen. We must stay
vigilant…
- We aim to learn from all events, so
that everyone gets to go home after
each voyage…

In practice, in any industry we learn most from our peers, and this
is equally true at the organisational or corporate level, which is
why Safety Forums and Safety Alliances between companies are so
important for Safety Learning.
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Conclusions
This White Paper has explored how the shipping
industry can improve operational safety, via in-depth
interviews of national investigators and seafarers,
as well as meetings and discussions with a range
of maritime representatives at various levels, from
shipping companies, NGOs and regulators. The
resulting recommendation is to develop a Safety
Learning Culture, and towards this end, ten good
practices in Safety Learning have been outlined.
There are two key waypoints on the journey towards
a Safety Learning Culture. The first is achieving
effective Safety Learning, based on more accurate
and consistent understanding of the critical factors
leading to incidents and accidents, as well as how to
avoid them via more systemic accident prevention
strategies that go beyond the single ship or isolated
event. This requires investigating differently, so that
there is more detailed and insightful reporting, and
the adoption of an enhanced taxonomy to describe
what happened and why, and how recurrence can
be prevented. An enhanced taxonomy requires
either enriching existing ones such as the Deadly
Dozen, or else developing and applying a new
taxonomy. Both avenues would benefit from an
increased application of the scientific discipline of
Human Factors in the shipping domain.
The second key waypoint is improving the shipping
industry’s Safety Learning integration, ensuring that
Safety Learning occurs at all levels, whether on the
ship, onshore, across the fleet, across a segment of
the industry, or throughout the industry as a whole.
Here is where approaches such as group-based
reviews, safety intelligence sharing, safety alliances
and top ten most wanted come into play. The latter
two approaches in particular would demonstrate
senior-level leadership, and would encourage Safety
Learning across the shipping community. This would
enable shipping to accomplish, in a matter of years,
the transition from the application of Safety Learning
practices, to the evolution of a true Safety Learning
culture, improving safety at sea, and safeguarding
the continued prosperity of the industry.

Safety Learning Use Cases
in the Shipping Industry
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USE CASE #1

Safety Learning in Action

Capt. Thodoris Lefakis,
Giorgos Diamantis and
Stelios Volakis
Minerva Marine & ATHINA
Training Center

This incident echoes the difficulties that may be encountered in inland navigation, particularly in limited
waterways such as the Mississippi River. Here, the prevailing strong current and ship-shore interaction
caused the bow of a laden oil tanker under pilotage to be deflected for a moment when entering
the cross current-influenced zone, affecting her maneuverability and leading her close to the bank.
Fortunately the vessel did not run aground, thanks to the reaction of the bridge team who ordered an
astern movement, resulting in the vessel’s forward port bottom softly touching the river’s sediments.
The bridge team did not effectively assess the
anticipated effect of ship-shore interaction
and of the strong current, and were overreliant on the Pilot’s orders to bring the vessel
close to the river’s east bank that eventually
“sucked” her stern towards the east bank
with her bow swinging dangerously to the
western side of the river.
Immediately after the notification of the
incident by the Master of the vessel, the
investigation process by the two professional
Investigators of the company was initiated
with collecting and preserving evidence to help understand as much of what and why this happened
and to establish a sequence of events leading to the incident. Due to its obvious potential impact, the
incident was classified as a high risk navigational incident of medium severity requiring - according
to the company’s policy and Safety Management Procedures - an Immediate Incident Notification to
be circulated as an alert to the whole fleet (Safety Learning Objective No. 7 Safety Intelligence Sharing).
The above classification of the incident is in line with adopting a common language (Safety Learning
Objective No.1 Common Language), so that the seagoing and shore personnel of the company refer
to and consider the type and the underlying causes of the incident clearly and unambiguously.

"The incident was
simulated and
incorporated into ship
handling training."

The ultimate goal of each investigation is to determine the

root causes of an incident, which if eliminated, could prevent
similar incidents from occurring by effectively learning from
them. These causes are always attempted to be identified not
only to the human performance level on the vessel (Master,
Pilot, Watch Keeping Officers and Ratings), or to the technical
conditions level, but also to the documented procedures, the
organization and to the management level of the company. The Marine Systematic Cause
Analysis Technique (M-SCAT) is being used by the company with the aim to support a rigorous
investigation of an incident (Safety Learning Objective No.2 Investigating Differently).
Through the analysis of the VDR (Voyage Data Recorder), the interviews with the Master
and the Officers on the bridge during the incident, their communication with the Pilot,

the analysis of information relating to their
experience, qualifications, possible fatigue
and other factors, a “picture” of the conditions
on the navigation bridge was reconstructed
looking especially at the relationship between
the employed Pilot and the ship’s team and
how the right and obligation of the Master to
intervene in case of the Pilot’s misjudgment
was exercised (Safety Learning Objective No.10
A Maritime Focused Human Factors Toolkit).
The incident was simulated in a full-mission
ship handling simulator of the ATHINA Maritime
Learning and Development Center (Minerva
Marine’s exclusive Training Center) based
on a similar ship model, the same environmental conditions and most importantly at the same
geographical area of the Mississippi River with the appropriate ENCs (electronic nautical charts)
RADAR images, visuals, traffic, landmarks and bathymetry. The incident had taken place during night
time (23:30 HRS), while the vessel was attempting a turn to starboard in a sharp right turn of the river
making around 7 knots (speed over ground) against 4 knots current and under 16 knots NE wind.
As required by the Incident Investigation, the scenario was incorporated in the Bridge Resource
Management Ship Handling Training Course, supporting the theoretical learning on the wind/
current effect and ship-shore interaction.
Additionally, the Master and the Officers
of the bridge team of the vessel attended
a refresher course prior to their next
assignment, and other Deck Officers now
participate in the above simulated exercise.
A Lesson Learnt Report for the incident was
circulated to the fleet of the company to be
discussed in a Safety Committee meeting
on each vessel. It was also included as a
case study in the agenda of the in-house
crew training seminars and forums (Safety
Learning Objective No.8 Safety Forums).
Learning effectively from incidents helps
Minerva Marine to further develop its
culture of learning as an integral part of,
and a measure of its overall Safety Culture,
which is supported by the company’s
inherent willingness to improve and
adapt, aiming for zero incidents.
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USE CASE #2

On Just Culture – a Marine
Investigator’s Viewpoint

USE CASE #3
Keith Fawcett,
Marine Investigator,
United States Coast Guard

In complex marine accidents the job
of a marine accident investigator can
be very difficult, especially when the
investigation is conducted where
there may be ramifications in terms of
the loss of a job, enforcement action
against a mariner’s credential or even
possible criminal prosecution. It can
be difficult for the investigator to even
imagine what went on in the complex
operations onboard the ship or within
a shipping company, which might have
been a significant contributing factor
to the accident. Licensed ships officers or company personnel fear that mistakes or errors may lead to
a finding of fault that may affect their livelihood.
As an investigator you probe deeply to gather the facts about an accident following all leads and even
following your well-developed investigator’s intuition. But as an experienced investigator and perhaps
a former mariner you may not understand all the underlying activities that took place aboard the
vessel or during its marine operation. Can you understand all the nuances of the complex world of
today’s shipping industry? Think about the times that you have completed an investigation and then
submitted an exhaustive report of investigation, only long after the investigation is completed you
find out an important piece of information that might have significantly influenced or changed your
analysis for that complex investigation.
Without the cooperation of witnesses at all levels of vessel and company operations you may miss
a very significant fact which directly led to the cause of the accident. Relying on interviews where
witnesses might be hesitant to disclose the truth, it is even more difficult when a witness is under oath
or being interviewed where making a false statement can be viewed as a violation of law. Adopting
a “Just Culture” and ensuring that you explain the nature and scope of the investigation and the
ground rules that support a “safety” investigation may reduce
this hesitancy to have witnesses come forward and give full and
"Without the cooperation
complete information. To effectively shift to more productive
of witnesses at all levels... interviews will require significant work throughout the marine
you may miss a very
industry and investigations community to ensure that the people
interviewed understand the fundamentals of a “Just Culture”,
significant fact."
that human error is just that, people can and do make mistakes.
Identifying the near misses, patterns, events and circumstances
that lead up to an accident is a daunting task for an investigator and a culture shift will result in more
effective investigations. Aggressively promoting this “Just Culture” framework for marine operations
and if necessary, conducting investigations, gathering facts and speaking to ship personnel at various
levels from oiler to Captain, when required, will lead to a deeper understanding of the underlying
causes of marine accident.
Photo insert is of the grounding of the Kulluk mobile offshore drilling unit in 2012 on the Alaskan coast.
Photo reprinted with the permission of USCG.

An Agile Approach to
Safety Learning Culture in
the RORO Sector

Mary Ann Pastrana,
FastCat,
APFC

Archipelago Philippine Ferries Corporation (APFC) is a RORO vessel company with decades of experience
in the industry, serving the needs of the travelling public and business entities nationwide through its
passenger and cargo services. The company aims to connect the Philippine islands using its state-ofthe-art and brand new vessels, FastCat. APFC has 18 vessels as of 2021 and has the goal of having a
fleet of 30 vessels by 2031, facilitating the economical movement of people & goods in the Philippines.
APFC ‘s state-of-the-art RoRo vessels are designed specifically for Philippine water conditions ensuring
its passengers’ safety, welfare and comfort. The vessels are fitted with world-class amenities and fully
compliant with international standards for lifesaving, firefighting, and damage-stability.
APFC takes pride in having built strong and
lasting ties with its brand commitment of
“Ferry Safe, Ferry Fast, Ferry Convenient"
travel. It ensures safety is top priority each
and every day by imbibing a strong safety
and learning culture spearheaded and
supported by top management.
In 2017, FastCat launched its E-learning
management system, called iLearnFastCat.
A platform where employees and crew
can cultivate knowledge on the different
maritime safety and training in standards
that are essential to the progression on
their competencies and ultimately the Philippine Marine Industry. The online training includes relevant
courses and modules from vessels, station bills, emergency signals, first aid apparatus and specific
safety features, the first of its kind in the country. iLearnFastCat is further
supported by the 4 pillars of continuous learning: portable training, “...a strong safety
advance analytics, quality content and expert support. ILearnFastCat
and learning culture
utilizes technology to raise awareness and let everyone be a part of the
solution, from students to the upper management. It is developed to spearheaded and
harness continuous learning and is aligned with the company mission and supported by top
vision to uphold growth in learning for its employees, crew and cadets.
management.”
For the Maritime students training with Fastcat, an Electronic Training
Record Book is in place which is aligned with the STCW standards. APFC is also part of the Safemode
Consortium and the learnings here are introduced and integrated in its Safety Management System.
In its daily operation, APFC has adopted the Entrepreneurial Operating System where the team
discusses its scorecard and people headline, and where issues, solutions and to-do’s are raised
without fear of being apprehended and blamed. Everyone’s participation is encouraged and
data are studied and used to improve processes and achieve its goals. Additionally, FastCat also
continues its drive to help boost local businesses and tourism, to uplift the lives of the Filipinos and
contribute to the overall economic development of the country.
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USE CASE #4

Rob Faricy,
Director of Safety
and Assurance
Ben Wood,
Safety Learning Manager
Lifeboats

Charting a Course towards
a Safety Learning Culture
In early 2020, we set out on our
new safety learning journey
at the Royal National Lifeboat
Institution (RNLI), the charity
that saves lives at sea in the
United Kingdom and Republic
of Ireland. At the core of our
approach is engagement with
our people – both volunteers
and employees. The simple
formula is that engagement
breeds trust, meaning people
feel psychologically safe to
share, which in turn enables us
to learn from them, helping us improve our risk controls that keep us all safe.

Drawing on feedback from those involved in our incident investigation process, it was clear that it
often felt like a process done to our people, rather than with them. As an organisation reliant on
volunteers, engagement and trust is paramount, and yet with the best intentions, we had created an
investigation process that frequently put those core tenets in jeopardy.
The happy coincidence is that an approach focused on engagement also lends itself to learning
about work as it’s really done from the people who actually do it. Actively listening to understand the
perspectives shared by those at the operational front line, asking them for their help in how we can
learn and improve enables us to better understand the system and environment in which our crews
and teams are operating. Our intent is to close the gap between `work as imagined` and `work as
done`.
To do that calls for a large and sometimes uncomfortable dose of
humility on the part of managers and leaders, as it starts with an
admission that we don’t have all the answers; our policies might be
impossible to implement, our procedures might be creating unintended
risks, our equipment might actually be unfit for purpose. The tables have
to turn so that we start listening rather than telling.

“Better safety
conversations lead
to positive safety
outcomes.”

The first tangible change was around our language. Our Investigation Team became the Safety Learning
Team, who conducted safety learning reviews as opposed to ‘investigations’. The learning teams are
deliberately inclusive of those directly involved in the occurrence working alongside subject matter
experts from across the organisation led by the Safety Learning Team. One-to-one formal interviews are
replaced by collaborative facilitated discussions with the teams involved in the work, in which they teach
us about the realities of work as done. To help these conversations we seek to create an environment
where people are free to speak up, without fear.
Alongside the learning team approach, for the analysis of our work we are exploring contemporary
safety science from Safety-II, Safety Differently and Human Factors. Techniques like barrier
management, task analysis and other tools help manage our critical safety risks.

“The feedback from
our first few safety
learning reviews has
been overwhelmingly
positive.”

Understanding performance influencing factors and how they
converge to create the conditions in which incidents sometimes
occur are key.
The intention is to use learning teams both reactively (following
an incident) and proactively (during normal operations) to test
the real-life effectiveness of our defences that make up our Safety
Management System.

The feedback from our first few safety learning reviews has been overwhelmingly positive, largely
thanks to the willingness of both our safety team and our operational crews to try new things,
make mistakes and learn from them. Implementing learning teams has itself been a learning
process, and our openness about that has really helped bring people on this journey with us.
Some of our next steps include;
• Creation of a dedicated independent directorate that will extend this approach to learning
from normal operations, through an independent assurance team.
• Development of a safety learning training package with external support to embed the key principles.
• Workshops to introduce the Safety II ‘new view’ thinking to a wider group of stakeholders.
• Bow-tie barrier management and fault and event tree risk modelling. Mapping of critical risks
and controls to focus our learning on those areas of greatest risk/criticality.
• Creation of a Safety Risk Insight Specialism in the RNLI, drawing learning from incidents and
assurance findings to drive improvement plans.
We’re still in the early stages of this transition, but there is a buzz around the teams involved,
and it’s an exciting thing to be a part of, and we are hugely optimistic about the future of safety
learning at the RNLI.
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USE CASE #5

A Look at CalMac
Ferries' Incident
Investigation Approach

Louis De Wolff,
Director of HSQE
Francesca Wade,
Safemode Researcher

CalMac Ferries Limited is a Scottish Ferries
company operating 34 ferries serving 50
ports and 24 island destinations, with 5.6
million passengers, 1.6 million cars and
over 150,000 sailings in a typical year.
To put that into an operational context, this
involves tight timetables and short sailings.
CalMac works to a safety strategy
(Total Safety II) designed to deliver an
improved safety performance as we
work towards a zero-accident culture.
Aligned to Scotland’s National Transport
Strategy, this strategy follows our Total
Safety Strategy. Successful delivery will
transform CalMac into an organisation that learns from all incidents and where everyone actively
works to improve our safety performance, strengthened by a Just Culture model.
It was recognised that the best way to improve safety is to look for trends and patterns in
current operations. To do this effectively, a lot of data are needed. To turn all the data into useful
management information, it is important to apply a standard analysis methodology. An effective
investigation process provides a valuable measure of the organisation’s safety performance.
By collating many reports and applying a standard method to incident analysis, the strengths
and weaknesses within the organisation’s systems can be identified. There were two major
barriers to gathering the data necessary for effective incident analysis. Firstly, there was a
practical issue of gathering information from across a fleet of 34 vessels and 50 ports.
Secondly there were issues with the culture and attitude of team members fearing blame and
repercussions for reporting incidents.
To overcome these barriers, in 2019, Calmac procured a new system called PURE. PURE is an electronic
system for the reporting and analysing of incidents. In this context an incident is an event that either
causes harm (to people, to assets or to the environment) or it does not. The first category where
harm is caused, is labelled an accident, with the second category, where no harm occurred is labelled
a Near Miss. Trust must exist to ensure that Near Misses and Incidents are reported. To build trust
in the organisation, a Just Culture framework must be implemented.
CalMac have engaged with consultants Baines Simmons to create
"Investigations are
a Just Culture framework that will be delivered towards the end of
carried out in a way 2022. Investigations are carried out in a way that creates learning
that creates learning opportunities, and these lessons must be communicated effectively
back to the fleet and ports that reported the incidents. This will allow
opportunities,"
for improvements to be implemented at an organisational level.

Incidents reported online
Our investigation approach is to learn. In order to "The method examines
do this, we need to encourage reporting and apply a
incidents to determine unsafe
standard method to incident analysis. The PURE system
acts, pre-conditions to these
is a streamlined reporting tool that allows easy access
to personnel across both fleet and shoreside locations. acts, supervisory factors and
The system is designed so that the reporter is required organisational influences."
to provide standard information on the incident, such as
environmental conditions, time stamps and a brief description of the incident. The reporter is then
prompted to do a basic analysis of the event using the ‘5 why’s’ methodology.
Assessed for impact
The number of events reported into Pure is typically
1200 each year- combining Accidents and Near Misses.
Upon receipt of the incident, shore-based personnel
triage the incidents using an assessment based on the
likelihood that the incident will repeat and the worst
credible outcome of the incident. This assessment
provides a score which determines the detail of the
follow-up investigation. Following CalMac’s procedures,
only those incidents scoring higher than 24 points,
are subjected to an analysis using the Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).
Analysed using HFACS
The HFACS methodology is embedded into PURE but is of a basic format. This methodology examines
incidents and relevant data to determine unsafe acts, pre-conditions to these acts, supervisory
factors and organisational influences. The options that can be selected at each category are predetermined and programmed into the software. This ensures a consistent analysis and provides a
platform that can be interrogated for incident trends. This moves away from identifying one root
cause to incidents, and instead looks for causation at various levels in the organisation. It allows the
analyst to identify the underlying factors associated with an unsafe act. Once these are identified it
allows us to improve our safety culture from a deeper level.
Since setting up this new approach to incident investigation we can clearly map our journey to date,
enabling us to see our progress. We are also able to learn from these trends to ensure appropriate
interventions are introduced. Since the introduction of PURE in 2019, this has resulted in improved
navigational standards, enhanced asbestos management, a reduction of serious incidents and better
engagement with the Network. In conclusion, CalMac has made progress in laying down the groundwork
to improve our safety culture over recent years. Although progress is still to be made, PURE has put
us on track to improve trust, improve reporting and to become an organisation that wants to learn.
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USE CASE #6

Reflective Safety Learning
for Seafarers

Stuart Edmonston
Director Loss Prevention,
UK P&I Club

As one of the largest mutual marine protection and indemnity
organisations in the world, the UK P&I Club insures over 240
million tonnes of owned and chartered ships from more than
fifty countries across the globe. The UK P&I Club is committed to
safety. Its high-level loss prevention programme – one of the most
extensive in the marine insurance industry – aims to offset rising
claims and maintain quality amongst Members.
Across the globe, every major industry is undergoing a digital
awakening, and the shipping sector is no different. The progressive
transition towards an increasingly digital and automated future brings with it safety, technical
and training challenges the industry will have to face.
As we look ahead, it’s more vital than ever to provide consistent, clear leadership. It’s integral to
develop training tools and methods, which, if used properly, will help to establish and embed a
sound and well run safety culture on board. Safety training at all levels is important because it has
the capacity to unite the managers ashore and seafarers in the pursuit of a common purpose – to
create a safe and secure workplace that ensures the welfare and success of everyone involved.
As an industry, we see the same incidents happening repeatedly. For the crewmembers involved,
and their families, these often tragic and avoidable accidents can be life changing. For shipowners
and operators, the financial impact of claims can be significant, in addition to the disruption and
inconvenience caused by accidents on board.
We are committed to safety and the Club’s high-level loss prevention programme aims to offset rising
claims and maintain quality among its members. As part of this drive to share knowledge and encourage
collaboration throughout the sector, the Club has recently expanded its award winning ‘Lessons Learnt’
reflective learning animated videos across personal injury, navigation, pollution, and cargo. These training
videos enable seafarers to learn not just by their own mistakes, but by the mistakes of others. Making the
videos freely available to the wider shipping community gives these vital safety messages enormous reach.
There is a great deal we can learn by casting the net outside our comfort zone, and collaborating
with like-minded organisations and companies from related industries. While it is acknowledged
that the maritime industry is very different from aviation in many respects, there may be lessons
worth learning from an industry with such an excellent safety record.
"... to learn not
Aviation has benefited from decades of research into the areas of risk
just by their own
management that others in the transport industry can learn from. A
mistakes, but by the unique initiative by the UK Club, in partnership with the world’s largest
mistakes of others." civil aviation training company CAE, offers and encourages a step
change in human performance crew training and safety outcomes for
shipowner members. Introduced by the Club in 2019 to boost member
access to top-class safety training, training sessions have taken place at CAE’s new EasyJet Gatwick
facility and JetBlue Orlando, and online after the pandemic struck.
In this moment, we operate in an industry in flux and exist in a world in crisis. Collectively as a sector,
it’s integral that we continue to adapt to these shifting demands and conditions, reviewing how
we can improve and enhance safety methods, training and services, while harnessing innovative
technological solutions and embracing collaboration.
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For further information, see:
safemodeproject.eu

